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SECTION 3500:
JUSTICE ON A TIGHTROPE
THEODORE A. BORiLLo*
INTRODUCTION
Exercising its power to prescribe rules of procedure and evidence
for the administration of justice in the federal courts,! the United
States Supreme Court in Jencks v. United States2 held that a defendant
in a criminal proceeding is entitled as a matter of right to statements
made by a government witness to an agent of the government, and
which relate to the events and activities about which that witness has
testified at trial. This overruled a prior practice in many United States
Courts of Appeal requiring, before production would be ordered, a
showing of inconsistency between the contents of the statements de-
manded and the testimony of the witness.3
The Jencks Court stated, however, that it was not authorizing "any
broad or blinding expedition among documents possessed by the Gov-
ernment,"4 but that the demand must be for specific documents, i.e.,
those that relate to the testimony.5 In this regard, it attempted to strike
a fair balance between according fair play and "justice" to the defend-
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. B.B.A.
1958, City College of New York; LL.B. 1954, St. John's University; LL.M.
1959, Harvard University.
I Congress has the power to prescribe such rules for the federal courts, and has
from the earliest days exercised that power. For a collection of such legisla-
tion see Frankfurter & Landis, Powers of Congress Over Procedure in Crim-
inal Contenpts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of
Powers, 37 HAtv. L. REV. 1010, app. I at 1074-1100 (1924). However, in the
absence of a relevant act of Congress, the United States Supreme Court can
exercise supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice in the
federal courts and, in this regard, may prescribe rules of pocedure and evi-
dence to follow. Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 418 (1953) ; McNabb
v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-42 (1943) ; FED. R. CraM. P. 26. For a
general discussion of this supervisory power see Comment, 9 KAN. L. REv. 317
(1961).
2353 U.S. 657 (1957).
3 Scanlon v. United States, 223 F. 2d 382 (1st Cir. 1955); Shelton v. United
States, 205 F. 2d 806 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Christoffel v. United States, 200 F. 2d
734 (D.C. Cir. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 345 U.S. 947 (1953) ; Iva Ikuko
Toguri D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F. 2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951); United
States v. De Normand, 149 F. 2d 622 (2d Cir. 1945) ; United States v. Ebeling,
146 F. 2d 254 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Little v. United States, 93 F. 2d 401 (8th Cir.
1937) ; Arnstein v. United States, 296 Fed. 946 (D.C. Cir. 1924). In this regard,
the Court in Jencks stated, "Requiring the accused first to show conflict be-
tween the reports and the testimony is actually to deny the accused evidence
relevant and material to his defense. The occasion for determining conflict
cannot arise until after the witness has testified, and unless he admits conflict
... the accused is helpless to know or discover conflict without inspecting the
reports." Jencks v. United States, supra note 2 at 667-68. (Emphasis added.)
4 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667 (1957), quoting with approval from
Gordon v. United States, supra note 1, at 419.
5 Id. at 667
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
ant, and the protection of national interests and security against com-
promise through possible overexposure of government files. Despite,
however, the efforts of the Court to clearly state its position, the caveat
of the dissent, that he ruling affords defense counsel a "Roman holiday
for rummaging through confidential information,"6 had alarming ef-
fects, which were aggrevated by a misapplication of the Jencks rule by
lower federal courts into unrelated areas.
7
Misunderstandings of the intended scope of the Jencks ruling led
to an almost immediate adoption of 18 U.S.C. §3500.8 While this
statute was admittedly designed to "clarify" and "reaffirm" the Court's
position in Jencks, during its brief period of incubation it has already
worked hardships to defendants alien to the rationale of that decision.
Inroads have developed whereby section 3500 can be employed as a
shield by the government against an assertion of rights originally meant
to be accorded an accused.
PROCEDURE GOVERNING THE PRODUCTION OF STATEMENTS
The general statutory aim of section 3500 is to aid the defense in
its attempt to impeach government witnesses,9 for no statement 0 is
required to be produced until the direct testimony of the government
witness has been elicited."'
After the witness has testified, the court shall, on motion of the de-
fendant, order the production of any statements related to the subject
matter of the testimony. 12 A motion for production is premature if
the government witness has not yet testified, 3 and must be renewed if
the benefits of the statute are to be availed of by the defense. 1 4 Also, a
6 Id. at 681-82.
7E.g., pretrial production of statements. See generally 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADM. NEWs 1861 (1957) (legislative history of 18 U.S.C. §3500 (1958)). Gen-
erally speaking, in civil law countries the statements of all prospective wit-
nesses are made available to the defendant in advance of trial. See Orfield,
Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal Procedure, 59 W. VA. L. REV.
221, 232-33 (1957).
8 The full text of the statute is set out in the appendix infra.
9 Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 349 (1959).
10A discussion of the meaning of the word "statement" as used in 18 U.S.C.
§3500 (1958), and its attendant problems, appears at pp. 13-16 infra.
11 18 U.S.C. §3500(a) (1958).
12 18 U.S.C. §3500(b) (1958). In Johnston v. United States, 260 F. 2d 345 (10th
Cir. 1958), a witness testified that he had signed a statement for the F.B.I.
However, since no request or motion was made by the defense for production
of the statement, the court held that no rights had been denied under 3500.
In Howard v. United States, 278 F. 2d 872 (D.C. Cir. 1960), the witness ad-
mitted to having made a statement and to having a copy in his possession.
The defense then asked the witness, "May I see it?" The court held this to
have been a sufficient demand for production, stating at page 874, ". . . no
ritual words could have made it any plainer that the defense wanted to see
the officer's report."
'3 Bullock v. United States, 265 F. 2d 683 (6th Cir. 1959) ; Johnston v. United
States, supra note 12; United States v. Rothman, 179 F. Supp. 935 (W.D.
Penn. 1959); United States v. Shindler, 24 F.R.D. 142 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).
" Rich v. United States, 261 F. 2d 536 (4th Cir. 1958); Johnston v. United
States, supra note 12.
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foundation must be laid for the motion, usually by asking the witness
on cross-examination whether he has made any statements or reports
to a government agent regarding the subject matter of his direct testi-
mony.1
5
Upon motion by the defendant, the court shall order the government
to produce and deliver directly to the defendant for his examination and
use all statements which in their entirety relate to the testimony. 6 If
the government claims that a statement containing relevant matter, also
contains unrelated matter, the statement is to be delivered to the court
for an in camera inspection by the trial judge.'7 The court is then to
exercise its discretion by excising that portion of the statement which
does not relate to the testimony, and delivering the unexcised portion
directly to the defendant for his use.' 8
Once it is determined that the documents in the possession of the
governments are "statements" within the terms of 3500, they must be
turned over to the defense without regard to national interests and se-
curity, 9 their "consistency" with the testimony,20 or their admissibility
as statements into evidence.2 '
With regard to that procedure dealing with in camera inspections,
section 3500 provides that if "any portion of such statement is withheld
25United States v. Kelly, 269 F. 2d 536 (10th Cir. 1959) (no foundation estab-
lished). There the court stated, at page 452, that the witness ". . . was not
asked whether he had made any statement or report. . . . In other words,
there was a complete absence of any evidence which tended to show directly
or indirectly that the secret files of the Government contained any statement
or report made by the witness relating to the matter."
16 18 U.S.C. §3500(c) (1958).
17 Ibid.
Is Ibid. The procedure outlined in section 3500 for excising unrelated portions of
statements has been upheld against attacks alleging a violation of the due pro-
cess provision of the Fifth Amendment. West v. United States, 274 F. 2d 885(6th Cir. 1960); Sells v. United States, 262 F. 2d 815 (10th Cir. 1958), cert.denied, 360 U.S. 913 (1959) ; Scales v. United States, 260 F. 2d 21 (4th Cir.
1958), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 917 (1958). For a general discussion of the
constitutional questions raised by the Jencks Act see Note, Jencks Act and
Constitutional Questions Raised By It, 58 MIcH. L. REv. 888 (1960); Com-
ment, 38 TEx. L. Rxv. 595, 608-12 (1960). The mechanics used in the federal
courts in complying with 3500 are to photostat the original document with the
excised parts covered, and then deliver the photostated copy to the defendant
for his use.19 West v. United States, supra note 18.
20 United States v. McKeever, 271 F. 2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1959). Also, the Jencks
Court recognized that "Flat contradictions between the witness' testimony and
the version of the events given in his reports is not the only test of inconsis-
tency. The omission from the reports of facts related at the trial, or a contrast
in emphasis upon the same facts, even a different order of treatment, are also
relevant to the cross-examining process of testing the credibility of a witness'
trial testimony." Jencks v. United States, supra note 2, at 667.
21 Palermo v. United States, supra note 9, at 353 n.10, 354. See also 18 U.S.C.§3500(c) (1958) which states that whenever any statement is delivered to a
defendant pursuant to 3500 ". .. the court in its discretion, upon application of
said defendant, may recess proceedings in the trial for such time as it may
determine to be reasonably required for the examination of such statement by
said defendant and his preparation for its use in the trial."
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from the defendant and the defendant objects to such withholding, and
the trial is continued to an adjudication of the guilt of the defendant,
the entire text of such statement shall be preserved by the United States
and, in the event the defendant appeals, shall be made aavilable to the
appellate court for the purpose of determining the correctness of the
ruling of the trial judge." 22
One of the weaknesses of section 3500 is that documents in the pos-
session of the government that are not "statements" within the meaning
of the statute, or that are "statements" but which do not relate to the
testimony, need not be turned over to the trial judge, nor need they be
preserved as part of the record on appeal for the appellate court to re-
view. This leads to the somewhat anomalous position that an appellate
review is available "if only part of a document is withheld from the
defense; none, if the entire document is withheld."
23
Clearly, a narrow construction by an overzealous prosecutor of what
constitute "statements," and what "statements" are "relevant," presents
a danger to the interests of the defense not easily remediable. The effect
of the vice of permitting the government to be the sole arbiter as to
what should be produced to the court is that no judicial tribunal will
ever have the opportunity to test the validity of government counsel's
determinations. Documents not surrendered remain sealed in the pos-
session of the Department of Justice-not subject to review. It is ap-
parent that compliance with the mandates of the statute can be danger-
ously frustrated when its operation is made to depend upon the caprice,
or lack thereof, of government counsel.
2 4
The severity of the problem has not escaped the attention of the
courts, for some relief has been provided against its consequences. In
Palermo v. United States,25 the United States Supreme Court stated:
When it is doubtful whether the production of a particular state-
ment is compelled by the statute, we approve the practice of hav-
ing the Government submit the statement to the trial judge for
an in camera inspection. Indeed, any other procedure would be
destructive of the statutory purpose.
2 6
In Campbell v. United States27 the Court moved against the prose-
cutor who is "without doubt" that the documents in his possession do
not meet the statutory requirements. There, a government witness who
22 Supra note 16. Many cases have been decided which have upheld trial judge
determinations of relevancy, e.g., Short v. United States, 271 F. 2d 73 (9th
Cir. 1959).
23 This issue was raised but not decided by the court in Travis v. United States
269 F. 2d 928, 944 (10th Cir. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 364 U.S. 310 (1961).
24And the problem should not be brushed aside by employing the handy pre-
sumption that government officials pursue their responsibilities in good faith,
for injustices may result under the present practice from "honest" differences
of opinion.
25360 U.S. 343 (1959).
26 Id. at 354. [Emphasis added.]
2781 S. Ct. 421 (1961).
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was an eye witness to a bank robbery on direct examination identified
the defendant as one of the robbers. On cross-examination he admitted
having talked to F.B.I. agents about the robbery, a report was prepared
by them and read back to him, which he approved as being essentially
what he had told them. Later, the witness qualified his testimony by
expressing some doubt as to whether he read the document over and
whether he had signed it. The defense moved pursuant to section 3500
for the production of this document but the government denied having
any documents which were "statements" within its possession. It did,
however, produce to the court an Interview Report of an interview by
F.B.I. agent Toomey with said witness and which related to his testi-
mony and rendered suspect his identification of the defendant. The gov-
erment contended, however, that the Report was not a "statement."
The Court, speaking generally, stated that when a defendant makes
a prima facie showing that the government might have in its possession
a document producible under section 3500, it becomes the duty of the
trial judge to take extrinsic evidence, or to require the government to
produce evidence, to assist him in reaching a determination as to whether
the document should be produced to the defense.28
Directing itself specifically to the Interview Report, the Court held
that a sufficient showing had been made to cast doubt on the determina-
tion by the government that it was not a "statement." And since it was
not possible to determine by a mere inspection and reading of the Re-
port whether it was a "statement," extrinsic evidence was required . The
28 The trial judge, in fulfilling his responsibility under such circumstances, should
first order government counsel to produce the document in question to the
court for an in camera inspection. See Bary v. United States, 292 F. 2d 53
(10th Cir. 1961). In Campbell v. United States, supra note 27, such an order
was not necessary since the government had voluntarily surrendered the
Interview Report to the Court, but accompanied by a concurrent assertion that
it was not a "statement."
29Accord, United States v. McKeever, supra note 20; Bary v. United States,
supra note 28. In the McKeever case, supra at 674, it was held that where the
court has doubts as to their being "statements" which cannot be resolved from
a mere inspection and reading of the documents, "The proper course would
have been for the trial court to conduct voir dire examination to obtain fur-
ther evidence bearing on the issues raised by the statutory requirements.
• . .The exclusion of these reports without voir dire was error' In the
Bary case, supra, the government admitted having 739 documents in its pos-
session "in connection with [a government witness'] . . .services," yet only 39
of these documents were produced to the defense as "statements." The wide
disparity between the number of documents in the possession of the govern-
ment, and the number produced, coupled with the language and conduct of the
government at trial (see Brief for Appellants, Bary v. United States, pp. 104-
09, supra) raised the doubt required for judicial intervention and supervision.
The court held that a controverted question had been raised with regard to
the propriety of the government's determinations as to "statements" and
"relevancy," and that the trial judge should have made an in camera inspec-
tion of the 700 documents left in the possession of the government. The court
added, "And in discharge of the responsibility resting upon the judge, an in-
quiry should be made as an aid to the court in making the judicial determina-
tion," citing Campbell v. United States, supra note 27.
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Court held that the trial judge or government should have called F.B.I.
agent Toomey, who had prepared the Report, to testify in order to
clarify the doubts, i.e., was the witness given the Report to read, did he
in some way approve it? The Court held it to be "further error" for the
trial judge to have permitted the witness himself to have been asked
about the document since this would require showing him the Report,
thereby undermining its effective use in cross-examination if it was a
''statement" or running the obvious risk that the witness' self-interest
might defeat the purpose of the statute.30 Nor would it have been proper
to have required the defendants to call and question Toomey since this
would have made him "their witness," thereby limiting their rights to
examining him and being possibly bound by his answers. 31
While these judicial inroads to some extent offer protection to de-
fendants against the "withholding" of documents, the progress has not
been of sufficient magnitude to alleviate the need for amending legisla-
tion. And the pitfall of the statute can be avoided without compromising
any interests of the government, by requiring all documents to be turned
over to the trial judge for an in camera inspection and for preservation
for review by the appellate courts. While this may cast an onerous bur-
den on the court in some cases, there are few who would contend that
a criminal defendant's rights should be subordinated because it would
be inconvenient for the court to honor those rights.
THE MEANING OF "STATEMENTS"
The so-called "Jencks" statute concerns documents in the possession
of the government that are "statements,"32 which have been defined to
include a document in the handwriting of the witness and signed or
otherwise adopted or approved by him, 33 and a "stenographic, mechani-
cal, electrical, or other recording . . . which is a substantially verbatim
recital of an oral statement made by said witness to an agent of the
Government and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such
oral statement. ' ' 34 The expression "other recording" includes manual,
such as a longhand report of an agent, as well as other automatic re-
cordings. 35
30 "For example, the Interview Report states that Staula [the witness] was
unable to give any description of one of the robbers. This is in sharp contrast
to his positive identification of Lester made on direct examination." The
defendants were ". . . deprived of the opportunity to make use of the report
by the obviously self-serving declarations of the witness that it did not accu-
rately record what he told the agent." Campbell v. United States, supra note
27, at 428.
31 As a witness called by the government or the court, the defendants would
have been entitled to subject the witness to cross-examination, a right which
offers greater latitude in questioning than does direct examination. Id. at 427.
32 18 U.S.C. §3500(e) (1958).
33 18 U.S.C. §3500(e) (1) (1958).
34 18 U.S.C. §3500(e) (2) (1958).
35 United States v. Waldman, 159 F. Supp. 747, 749 (D. N.J. 1958).
[Vol. 45
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The efforts of Congress in so defining "statements" was to restrict
the production of documents to those which as nearly as possible reflect
the witness' own words, thereby minimizing the danger of distortion.
As stated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Palermo, it is important that the document "fairly be deemed to reflect
and without distortion what had been said to the government agent.
Distortion can be tle product of selectivity as well as the conscious or
inadvertent infusion of the recorder's opinions or impressions." 36
Therefore, in determining whether a document is "substantially ver-
batim" one should consider the extent to which it conforms to the lan-
guage of the interview, 37 and the length of the document in comparison
to the length of the interview.38
The statute also requires that the interview results be "contemporan-
eously recorded," 39 and a summary report of an interview with a wit-
ness made "ten or fifteen days" thereafter was held not to have been a
"statement." 40 Obviously, Congress did not want to trust the results of
an interview to the fallibility of memory. However, if "contemporane-
ously recorded," the document is nevertheless a "statement" though
transcribed at a later time.
41
Clearly, a significant hazard present in section 3500 is the oppor-
tunity it affords the government to efficaciously insulate itself against
disclosure, thereby negating the promise of Jencks. A selective summary
of the witness' remarks, or an insertion by the agent making the report
of his subjective impressions, interpretations, and conclusions 42 would
effectively place the document beyond production.
In view of the position taken by the Court in Palermo v. United
States that section 3500 is the exclusive procedure for the production of
documents in the possession of the government, 43 a more liberal inter-
38 Supra note 9, at 352.
37 United States v. Thomas, 282 F. 2d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 1960) ; United States v.
Stromberg, 268 F. 2d 256, 273 (2d Cir. 1959); United States v. Waldman,
supra note 35.
38 Palermo v. United States, supra note 9, at 355 n.12.
39 In United States v. McKeever, supra note 20, at 675, the court indicated that
contemporaneously made does not mean simultaneously made.4o Borges v. United States, 270 F .2d 332 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
41 "[T]he statute requires not that the transcription shall be contemporaneous,
but that its recording shall be.. . ." United States v. Waldman, supra note 35.
42 "Are think it consistent with this legislative history, and with the generally
restrictive terms of the statutory provision, to require that summaries of an
oral statement which evidence substantial selection of material, or which were
prepared after the interview without the aid of complete notes, and hence
rest on the memory of the agent, are not to be produced. Neither, of course,
are statements which contain the agent's interpretations or impressions."
Palermo v. United States, supra note 9, at 353. [Emphasis added.] United
States v. Grunewald, 162 F. Supp. 621, 624 (S.D. N.Y. 1958); United States
v. Anderson, 154 F. Supp. 374, 375 (E.D. Miss. 1957).
43 See generally pp. 29-32 infra for a discussion of the Palermo position of "ex-
clusivity" with regard to section 3500.
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pretation of "statement" is required if homage is to be paid to the
Jencks decision.
Surely, the insertion of notes and impressions by the agent making
the report should not prevent the document from being a "statement"
since these can be easily excised by the trial judge. And as so ably
pointed out by Justice Brennan in Palermo:
[A] statement can be most useful for impeachment even
though it does not exhaust all that was said upon the occasion.
We must not forget that when confronted with his prior state-
ment upon cross-examination the witness always has the oppor-
tunity to offer an explanation."
A commendable strike forward was taken in United States v. Camp-
bel 4 5 toward freeing "statement" from its confining definition. There
the Court held that a summary report of an interview prepared by an
F.B.I. agent is a "statement" if the witness has read and in some way
approved of the report, though the report is not substantially verbatim
and was not contemporaneously recorded.
STATEMENTS MADE "To AN AGENT OF THE GOVERNMENT"
A "statement" must have been made "by a Government witness ...
to an agent of the Government" for it to be producible under section
3500.46 Hence, where a government witness had prepared notes in his
own handwriting to use simply to refresh his memory regarding his
prospective testimony prior to coming to court, the notes were not made
subject to production since his comments were not made to a govern-
ment agent.4
7
Also, it has been held that the words "to an agent of the Govern-
ment" do not circumscribe the operation of the statute to government
informant witnesses. 4" It is equally operative against an agent of the
government who is a witness and who has made a report to another
agent of the government. 49 This leads to the following seemingly anomo-
44 Supra note 9, at 365 (concurring opinion). For a case applying the evidentiary
rule of testimonial completeness to 3500 statements see Short v. United States,
supra note 22.
4581 S. Ct. 421 (1961).
46 18 U.S.C. §3500(a) (1958). [Emphasis added.] United States v. Garrison, 168
F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Wis. 1958).
47 See McGill v. United States, 270 F. 2d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1959). However, if the
witness refers to the notes while on the witness stand for the purpose of re-
freshing his recollection, a rule of evidence entitles counsel, upon request, to
look at the notes. McGill v. United States, supra at 331 (dictum) ; see gen-
erally McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 14-18 (1954).
4S United States v. Berry, 277 F. 2d 826 (7th Cir. 1960).
49Clancy v. United States, 365 U.S. 312 (1961) ; Karp v. United States, 277 F.
2d 843, 847-48 (8th Cir. 1960); United States v. Sheer, 278 F. 2d 65, 67-68(7th Cir. 1960); Holmes v. United States, 271 F. 2d 635 (4th Cir. 1959);
United States v. O'Connor, 273 F. 2d 358, 360-61 (2d Cir. 1959) ; United States
v. Prince, 264 F. 2d 850 (3rd Cir. 1959) ; United States v. De Lucia, 262 F. 2d
610 (7th Cir. 1958).
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lous situation. Assume government agent X interviews W and then files
with his superior in the F.B.I. a summary report of the interview pre-
pared in X's handwriting and signed by him. The report, however, is
not substantially verbatim, nor did W ever read and approve the re-
port. If W were to testify as a government witness, the summary report
would not be producible under section 3500. However, if X were to
testify for the government, the report would be a "statement" by X
and producible if related to X's testimony.
A question that has not yet arisen is whether "statements" made by
a government witness to a state investigative official should be made
available to a defendant in cases where the "statements" have been
turned over to the federal government to aid it in its prosecution of the
case. Although such "statements" are not made to an agent of the
United States government, and therefore technically not within section
3500, it seems justice would require that they be produced since they
are in the possession and control of the United States.
STATEMENTS "IN THE POSSESSION OF THE UNITED STATES"
The scope and meaning of "possession" as used in section 3500
merits comment. The statute requires the production of "any statement
... of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates
to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified."50
In United States v. West51 the government relied upon the testimony
of an F.B.I. agent named Gardner. Three investigative reports which
allegedly related to his testimony and been prepared by Gardner and
filed with the F.B.I. These reports were in the possession of the U.S.
Attorney in Colorado who was, at the time of the West trial, prose-
cuting United States v. Travis,52 which involved an almost identical
offense5 3 Gardner was also called as a witness in the Travis case and
one of the three reports was there produced to the defense. The U.S.
Attorney in the West case 54 had not been furnished copies by the F.B.I.
of these reports and so none were produced at trial. On appeal the de-
fendant urged that his rights under section 3500 had been denied. In
this regard the court stated, "The District Attorney could not very well
be guilty of suppressing F.B.I. investigative reports of which he had
no knowledge and which he did not possess." 5
Clearly, the restrictive attitude of the West court is not called for
by section 3500, which does not condition the production of statements
5018 U.S.C. §3500(b) (1958). [Emphasis added.]
51 170 F. Supp. 200 (E.D. Ohio 1959).
52 Sipra note 23.
53 Travs was charged as a union official with filing a false noncommunist affida-
vit with the National Labor Relations Board in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1001.
West was charged with a conspiracy to do the same.
54 United States v. West, supra note 51, at 209.
55 Ibid (dictum). Cf. Taylor v. United States, 229 F. 2d 826, 833 (8th Cir. 1956).
19611
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on any knowledge, or actual possession, by the local prosecuting attorney
but refers to statements "in the possession of the United States."
In view of the language employed in section 3500, the government
should be held accountable for the production of all "statements" which
it, as an entity, has in its possession at the time of trial.5 6 This view has
support from the United States Supreme court in United States v. Na-
tional Exchange Bank,57 an analogous decision involving a rule of bills
and notes. There a check on the U.S. Treasurer (drawee) was drawn
by a disbursing clerk in the Veterans Bureau (drawer) in favor of one
Beck for $47.50. Beck altered the check to read $4750 and it was ulti-
mately negotiated to the defendant bank, a bona fide purchaser, and fi-
nally presented to the U.S. Treasurer and the raised amount collected.
The United States sought to recover the overpayment because made
under "a mistake of fact." A rule of negotiable instruments states that
"if the drawer and the drawee are the same the drawer cannot recover
for an overpayment to an innocent payee because he is bound to know
his own checks."5"s The Government argued the rule to be inapplicable
in that "the hand that drew and the hand that was to pay were not the
same." 59 The Court viewed the Government as an entity and denied
recovery, holding that in spite of its bigness and geographical scope of
its dealings, one arm of the Government was responsible for what an-
other arm of the Government was doing.
An adherence to the West court's view of "possession" must be
avoided lest the danger that a defendant's rights under section 3500 be
frustrated and lost in the labyrinth of bureaucracy. Surely, "justice"
under section 3500 was not intended to mean one thing in Ohio and yet
another in Colorado.
SECTION 3500 AND GRAND JURY MINUTES
Although grand jury minutes are without doubt "substantially ver-
batim" and "contemporaneously recorded," the United States Supreme
Court in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States0 held section 3500
to be inapplicable to such prior "statements." In so ruling, the Court
upheld the long-established policy of secrecy which has guarded grand
56 Certainly, no intentional or "negligent" destruction of "statements" by the
government prior to trial should be sanctioned by the court. For a case in-
volving an innocent destruction prior to trial of the original notes of an
interview see United States v. Thorn, 282 F. 2d 191 (2d Cir. 1960). Cf. De
Freese v. United States, 270 F. 2d 737 (5th Cir. 1959).
57270 U.S. 527 (1926).
58 Id. at 534. Cf. Bank of the United States v. Bank of Georgia, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 333 (1825) (promissory note).
9 United States v. National Exchange Bank, supra note 57, at 534.
60360 U.S. 395 (1959). To the same effect, United States v. Killian, 275 F. 2d
561, 571-72 (7th Cir. 1960); Parr v .United States, 265 F. 2d 894 (5th Cir.
1959), rev'd on other grounds, 363 U.S. 370 (1960) ; United States v. Spange-
let, 258 F. 2d 338 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Consolidated Laundries
Corporation, 159 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. N.Y. 1958).
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jury minutes against disclosure6' in the absence of showing "a particu-
larized need" that outweighs the need for secrecy.62
The Pittsburgh Plate Glass decision was severely criticized in the
persuasively written dissenting opinion by Justice Brennan,6 3 the author
of Jencks. There he stated that:
The considerations that moved us to lay down [the Jencks
principle] . . . as to prior statements of government witnesses
made to government agents obviously apply with equal force to
the grand jury testimony of a government witness. 6 4
For example, the "particularized need" standard is met in cases where
some inconsistency exists between the grand jury testimony and the
trial testimony of a government witness.65 Clearly, as has been noted,
this was the pre-Jencks rule with regard to statements in the possession
of the government,66 and the difficulty to a defendant of establishing
such inconsistency was what motivated the Jencks Court.
6 7
Also, the traditional reasons underlying the secrecy of grand jury
minutes become moot once the trial has begun and the government wit-
ness has testified. Essentially, these reasons are:
61 The rule of secrecy was zealously enforced in early English law. Blackstone
reports that "antiently it was held, that if one of the grand jury disclosed to
any person indicted the evidence that appeared against him, he was thereby
made accessory to the offense, if felony; and in treason a principal. And at
this day it is agreed, that he is guilty of a high misprison, and liable to be
fined and imprisoned." 4 B1. Comm. *126 (citations omited). See also In re
Summerhayes, 70 Fed. 769 (N.D. Cal. 1895) (grand juror punished for con-
tempt for revealing proceedings of grand jury).
62United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958). Rule 6(e) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which governs disclosure of grand
jury minutes is but declaratory of case law. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v.
United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399 (1959). It has been held that a defendant
charged with having perjured himself before the grand jury is ertitled to the
minutes of his own testimony before the grand jury, to afford him a fair
opportunity to prepare his defense. United States v. Rose, 215 F. 2d 617
(3d Cir. 1954) ; United States v. Remington, 191 F. 2d 246 (2d Cir. 1951).
63 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 401-10 (1959).
Chief justice Warren, Justice Black, and Justice Douglas joined in the dissent.
64 Id. at 408.
65 This principle is recognized in Parr v. United States, supra note 60, at 901-04
(harmless error); Travis v. United States, supra note 23, at 945-47; United
States v. Spangelet, supra note 60, at 341-42; United States v. H.J.K. Theater
Corporation, 236 F. 2d 502, 508-09 (2d Cir. 1956) (harmless error); Herzog
v. United States, 226 F. 2d 561, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1955). In cases where the
defendant has shown that there may be a variance between the grand jury
and trial testimony of a government witness, the proper procedure is for the
trial court judge, upon motion by the defendant, to read the grand jury record
related to the testimony in question, to determine whether there are any incon-
sistencies, and if there are, to permit the defendant to use the pertinent grand
jury testimony for impeachment purposes. United States v. H.J.K. Theater
Corporation, supra at 507. But see United States v. Spangelet, supra (court
required to inspect minutes without necessity of evidentiary foundation). A
court is permitted, in the exercise of sound discretion, to limit the use of grandjury minutes to prevent merely cumulative impeachment. United States v.
H.J.K. Theater Corporation, supra at 508-09.
66 See text supra at 205.67 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 666-69 (1957).
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(1) To prevent the accused from escaping before he is in-
dicted and arrested or from tampering with the witness against
him. (2) To prevent disclosure of derogatory information pre-
sented to the grand jury against an accused who has not been
indicted. (3) To encourage complainants and witnesses to come
before the grand jury and speak freely without fear that their
testimony will be made public thereby subjecting them to possible
discomfort or retaliation. (4) To encourage the grand jurors to
engage in uninhibited investigation and deliberation by barring
disclosure of their votes and comments during the proceedings .6
In this regard, it must be remembered that disclosure under section 3500
does not call for a complete abandonment of secrecy but only with re-
gard to those minutes which relate to the testimony given at trial.
Grand jury testimony is available to the government for assistance
in preparing for trial 6 9 refreshing the recollection of witnesses at
the trial,70 and for impeachment. 71 It seems that "justice requires no
less" than that grand jury testimony which relates to the testimony of a
government witness be made available to the defendant, if not under
section 3500, then by extending the application of the "particularized
need" rule to this situation.7 2
CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 3500
If during the trial the government elects not to comply with an order
of the court for the production of documents, "the court shall strike
from the record the testimony of the witness, and the trial shall pro-
ceed unless the court in its discretion shall determine that the interests
of justice require that a mistrial be declared. 7 3
On appeal, in instances where the record is vague on whether a
defendant has been denied a "statement" producible under section 3500,
the matter will be remanded to the trial court for a hearing solely to
determine that issue.
74
68 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, supra note 63, at 405.
69 United States v. Procter & Gamble, supra note 62, at 678.
70United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 231-37 (1940). When
the government uses grand jury minutes at trial in this manner, the minutes
must be shown to defense counsel upon demand. United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., supra at 233. Cf. 3 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE 108-11 (3d. ed. 1940).
71 United States v. Cotter, 60 F. 2d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1932). In such cases, a
defendant is entitled to inspect the grand jury testimony of the witness im-
peached.
72 In Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, supra note 63, the United States
Supreme Court rested its decision on the ground that a witness' testimony
before a grand jury was not discoverable as a matter of right under section
3500. The petitioners did not invoke the discretion of the trial judge to rule
that "a particularized need" existed for disclosure. In United States v. Grune-
wald, 162 F. Supp. 621 (S.D. N.Y. 1958), the government recognized the
fairness of permitting the defendant access to grand jury testimony by making
available such testimony even though not bound to do so.
73 18 U.S.C. §3500(d) (1958).
74 Campbell v. United States, supra note 27. Contra, Bary v. United States, supra
note 28 (new trial ordered). In the Bary case, supra, doubt had been created
as to 700 documents in the possession of the government, whereas in the
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If it appears that rights under section 3500 have been denied, the
court will order a new triaF5 unless the error is considered harmless.78
The application of the harmless error rule must necessarily depend upon
a careful analysis of the facts and circumstances of each case. It has
been applied in cases where the information contained in the withheld
"statement" was otherwise in the possession of the defendant. For ex-
ample, it was harmless error for the government to have withheld a
typewritten copy of a "statement," the original of which was in the pos-
session of the defense counsel.7 7 Similarly, where the government wit-
ness had testified as to the contents of the unproduced "statement."78
Generally, in cases where the defendant was not in possession of
the "withheld" information, appellate courts have been reluctant to
substitute their judgment for that of defense counsel regarding the
utility of the unproduced "statements.."79 As the Jencks Court stated,
"only the defense is adequately equipped to determine [their] . . . ef-
fective use for the purpose of discrediting the Government's witness.
. . ."0 Indeed, while it is an easy task to second guess a lawyer, there
are too many imponderables outside the record for an appellate court
to proceed to the trial forum, and there perform, out of context, the
duties of trial defense counsel.81 For example, the manner in which the
Campbell case, supra, only one document was in issue. Compare Clancy v.
United States, supra note 49 (government's position not supported by the
record).
73 Clancy v. United States, supra note 49; Campbell v. United States, supra note
27; United States v. Sheer, supra note 49; Holmes v. United States, supra
note 49; United States v. Prince, supra note 49; Bergman v. United States,
253 F. 2d 933 (6th Cir. 1958).78 Rosenberg v. United States, 360 U.S. 367 (1959).
7 Ibid.
78 Ibid. Cf. United States v. Killian, supra note 60, at 570-71. The dissent in
Rosenberg, supra note 76 at 373-77, emphasizes the need, in applying the harm-
less error rule, to consider the importance of the testimony of the witness to
which the denial under section 3500 relates.
79 Supra note 75. In Holmes v. United States, supra note 49, at 638-39, the
court, in distinguishing the Rosenberg case, supra note 76, stated, "[There] a
failure to deliver certain documents was held to be harmless error, but there
it appeared affirmatively that the defense had in its possession the original of
one of the unproduced documents and the witness had affirmatively testified
on the stand to the content of the other unproduced documents containing
related matter. Here it is not contended that the defense had the information
contained in the portion of the file which was not produced." In Clancy v.
United States, supra note 49, 29 U.S.L. WmC 4241, 4242 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1961),
the Court stated, "Since the production of at least some of the statements
withheld was a right of the defense, it is not for us to speculate whether
they could have been utilized effectively." In Karp v. United States, 277 F. 2d
843 (8th Cir. 1960), however, where the government failed to comply with
section 3500, it was held harmless error for the trial judge to have failed to
strike the testimony from the record where the defendant's testimony did not
materially vary from the testimony which should have been stricken.80 Jencks v. United States, supra note 67, at 668-69.
81 The court in United States v. Castillo-Acevedo, CM 360555, 12 C.M.R. 318,
324 (1952), in discussing whether an accused had been denied effective assist-
ance of counsel, stated that the considerations that form the basis for a tactical
decision on the trial level ". . . are of such subtle nature that their application
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government witness has testified,s2 and the zeal and ability of trial de-
fense counsel, will bear upon the utility of a withheld "statement," and
the record is usually barren in this regard. Any quick condonation of
error must therefore be avoided. Furthermore, some merit must be
given to the position that any omission under the statute is substantial,
since its mandate is not made to depend upon the utility of the "state-
ment," but only upon its being related to the subject matter of the testi-
mony of a government witness.8 3
THE EXCLUSIVE EFFECT OF SECTION 3500
The United States Supreme Court in Palermo v. United States,
faced with its initial interpretation of section 3500, stated that a memo-
randum prepared by an agent of the government summarizing an in-
terview with a government witness "which cannot be produced under
the terms of... 3500 cannot be produced at all."' s 4 The Court stated that
"the statute does not, in so many words, state that it is ... exclusive....
But some things too clearly evince a legislative enactment to call for a
redundancy of utterance."' 5
is as varied as grains of sand on the ocean floor." The court went on to say,
"It is this elusive quality which distinguishes the office lawyer from the advo-
cate. It would be capricious and foolhardy for any appellate body to proceed
to the trial forum in retrospect there, and with precisely drawn lines, dis-
tinguish between the varying shades of the advocate's art."
82 In discussing the importance of cross-examination, the distinguished advocate,
Lloyd Paul Stryker, in his work The Art of Advocacy (1954), on page 87,
states, "The general deportment of the witness, not only what he says but the
way he says it-this, if carefully observed, will give you many clues. Did he
hesitate? Did he look off into space? Did he moisten his lips and seem per-
turbed? Did he stammer and needlessly repeat himself? And above all, what
is your impression as to how the jury reacted to him? Did they seem to
believe him or were there some jurors, at least, whose expressions spelled
incredulity?" Certainly, a "statement" can be used more effectively against an
uncertain, ill-tempered, "smart-alecky" type witness than one who is well com-
posed and "believable."
83 United States v. Prince, supra note 49. In Bergman v. United States, supra
note 75, at 935, the court stated, "[T]he failure of the district court to make
[the government witness'] ... prior statement available to the defense requires
that the judgments be set aside. We reach this conclusion with reluctance
in view of the liklihood that the failure to make [the] . . . statement available
actually worked no prejudice to the defendants, and in view of the generally
conscientious and fair conduct of the long and complicated trial by the dis-
trict judge."
84 Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 351 (1959). [Emphasis added.]
85 Id. at 350. It is not clear from a reading of the Palermo decision whether the
Court intended to limit the exclusive effect of the statute with regard to pro-
duction to the statements and reports of witnesses who have testified, or to
also preclude the production of statements and reports of individuals not
called to testify. In United States v. Greathouse, 188 F. Supp. 765 (N.D.
Ala. 1960), the defendant had pleaded guilty to an offense and was awaiting
sentence. He moved for the production of statements and reports that had
been made by "prospective" government witnesses to an agent of the govern-
ment which might aid the defendant in his hearing on the sentence. These
statements, however, were of "witnesses" who had not testified at trial. In
view of the defendant's plea of guilty, the court held that to make such
statements and reports available would violate section 3500, subsection (a)
of which states that "no statement or report in the possession of the United
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Assume the following hypothetical. The government is in posses-
sion of a summary report prepared by an agent of the government
which states that W was interviewed for several hours and denied any
knowledge of the offense in question. Later, W testifies at trial as a key
government witness and relates at length his "knowledge" of the de-
fendant's alleged criminal conduct. If the summary report is not a
"statement" within section 3500, under the Palermo rule of "exclusivity"
it cannot be produced at all.86
The Jencks Court, in reaching its conclusion, stated that "the interest
of the United States in a criminal prosecution '. . . is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done. .. .' '" It seems inconceivable
that Congress intended by section 3500 to so diminish this fastidious re-
gard for the untainted administration of criminal justice demonstrated
by the Jencks decision.
Indeed, the "exclusive attitude of the Palermo Court has not inter-
fered with the production of grand jury testimony where "a particu-
larized need" can be shown, though production of such testimony is not
possible under section 3500.88 Similarly, the interests of justice require
States which was made by a Government witness or prospective Government
witness . . .to an agent of the Government shall be the subject of subpoena,
discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination
in the trial of the case." Cf. United States v. Rothman, 179 F. Supp. 935, 937
(W.D. Penn. 1959). It seems, however, that this conclusion is not required by
Palermo since the Court was there confronted with a report concerning a
witness who had testified.
86 In the Palermo case, "government counsel suggested that the primary remedy
of the defendant was to call the interviewer. Of course this would only be
adequate if the defense had some reason to believe that an interview of such
character had taken place and if the witness recalled the interviewer's name."
Palermo v. United States, supra note 84, at 362 n.l. See also Napue v. Illinois,
360 U.S. 264 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957); Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) ; Curren v. Deleware, 259 F. 2d 707 (3d Cir.
1958); Wild v. Oklahoma, 187 F. 2d 409 (10th Cir. 1951).
87 Jencks v. United States, supra note 67, at 688, quoting with approval from
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). To the same effect, Canon 5,
American Bar Association, Canons of Professional Ethics (1947).
88 See generally pp. 21-25 supra. Also, in enacting section 3500 Congress in no
way intended to supplant or in any way modify discovery under rules 16 and
17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Comment, 58 MIcH.
L. Rav. 888, 890-93 (1960). Neither rule, however, is a boon to the defendant
seeking the kind of inspection sought in Jencks.
Rule 16 states, "Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing
of the indictment or information, the court may order the attorney for the
government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph desig-
nated books, papers, documents or tangible objects, obtained from or belong-
ing to the defendant or obtained from others by seizure or by process, upon a
showing that the items sought may be material to the preparation of his de-
fense and that the request is reasonable. . . ." [Emphasis added.] This rule
is of no benefit to an accused when the documents sought are the reports of
government agents in the hands of the prosecution. United States v. Roth-
man, supra note 85, at 938. Furthermore, a clear showing must be made of
the specific documents sought and their materiality to the preparation of the
defense. "Naked motions [that] .. .have the complexion of a general fishing
expedition" will not be acknowledged. United States v. Rothman. supra note
85, at 939.
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the doors be open for the production of documents falling without the
"barriers" of section 3500, particularly since the scope of the Jencks
ruling with regard to production is broader than that of section 3500,
and its judicial interpretations.8 9
Also, one must be mindful of the fact that many government wit-
nesses are paid informers whose very livelihood depends upon their
performance in a courtroom 0 In such instances, the motive for "dis-
tortion" is great ;91 hence, the search to determine credibility must be
even greater. In fairness to an accused, the United States Supreme
Court must either regress from its present position of "exclusivity," or
expand the area of producible documents by liberalizing the interpreta-
tion that has been given "statements," if the spirit of the Jencks decision
is to be fostered.
CONCLUSION
Section 3500 is one of the few arrows a criminal defendant holds in
his quivver to effectively strike against memory that has been treacher-
ously dulled or distorted by time. Unfortunately, however, the path of
its flight has been beset with obstacles that has prevented it from strik-
ing with the full impact of the promise of Jencks. The "uncontrolled"
discretion of government counsel, the confining interpretation of "state-
ments," and the role of "exclusivity" have already been discussed. Other
problems will undoubtedly present themselves as more cases unfold.
For example, the boundary lines of "relevancy" have not been clearly
Rule 17(c) states that, "A subpoena may also command the person to whom
it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents or other objects desig-
nated therein . . . The court may direct that books, papers, documents or
objects designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time
prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their
production permit the books, papers, documents or objects or portions thereof
to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys." In Mesarosh v. United
States, 13 F.R.D. 180, 183 (W.D. Penn. 1952), the court stated that "Rule
17(c) is not a discovery rule, its purpose is to shorten trials and to make it
possible to require production before the trial of documents subpoened for
use at trial." In Bozcnnan Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 221 (1951)(dictum), the Court read into the rule the requirement that the materials
designated in the subpoena be evidentiary, i.e., admissable in evidence. See
also United States v. Garrison, 168 F. Supp. 622, 625 (E.D. Wis. 1958).
For an involved discussion of the operation of rules 16 and 17(c), see
Orfield, Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal Procedure, 59 W. VA.
L. REv. 221, 312 (1957).
89 The Jencks Court did not circumscribe the right of a defendant to inspect
documents in the possession of the government by the criteria which governed
the Palermo Court, namely, 3500's definition of "statements." See generally
pp. 13-16 supra. To accord section 3500 a narrower construction than that
intended by the Jencks decision has serious constitutional implications. See
Comment, 58 MIcH. L. REv. 888 (1960); Comment, 31 So. CALIF. L. REv. 78
(1957).
8 Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956) ; Fisher v. United States, 231
F. 2d 99 (9th Cir. 1956) (government witness paid $10,530 for his services as
informer).
91 See supra note 90.
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marked.9 2 Also, some measure must be taken at trial to control tht ac-
countability of documents, to avoid the confusion that presently attends
any reference to documents on both the trial and appellate levels of a
proceeding.9 3
The Jencks rule represents a development in the administration of
criminal justice far more worthwhile than many previous attempts to
maintain a trial above the "plimsoll line" of fair play. The statute, how-
ever, has retreated somewhat from the initial liberality of the Jencks
decision. The doors which the Jencks Court sought to shut against un-
fairness are being slowly pushed ajar. A concerted and determined ef-
fort must be made to keep them shut, no matter how loud the hinges
may squeak.
92 For example, should a statement which may be of aid to cross-examination
and even admissable in evidence to impeach a witness, be ordered to be pro-
duced to a defendant although not directly relevant to the subject matter of
the testimony? 'One prime example may be found in statements showing
strong bias, another in reports indicating a propensity to lie in fact situations
analogous to that immediately involved. The latter statements are evidence
of 'mythomania'-psychic unbalance resulting in delusions-the chronic prose-
cutrix in rape cases being particularly illustrative. Both types of material
have long been acknowledged as important sources of impeaching information.
In situations comparable to Jencks, involving alleged subversive activities, an
acute need for such information exists. The accusing witnesses in this area
of especially strong prejudgments have on occasion been recognized to tend
to delusions, and are commonly informers, spies and agent provacateurs, a
class of witnesses whose testimony has traditionally been suspect and only
reluctantly admitted in evidence." Comment, 67 YALE L J. 674, 694 (1958)
(citations omitted). Surprisingly, to date, there has been no authoritative
pronouncement as to the meaning of "relates to the subject matter to which
the witness has testified," 18 U.S.C. §3500(b) (1958). In Rosenberg v. United
States, supra note 76, at 370, the Court stated that "A statement by a witness
that she fears her memory as to the events at issue was poor certainly 'relates
to the subject matter as to which the witness had testified' and should have
been given to defendant." It is suggested that "relates," as used in section
3500, be interpreted to include all statements that in any way affect the sub-ject matter of the given testimony.
3 In this regard, it is suggested that a subsection be added to section 3500 to
this effect: Each document in the possession of the United States, shall be
identified by letter or number distinctive from the trial exhibit identification,
and when the United States makes disposition of any such documents, it shall
take appropriate receipts therefor. If the documents are delivered directly to
the defendant, and are not offered in evidence, they shall be returned by the
defendant to the United States, who shall give receipts therefor. If the docu-
ments are delivered to the judge for an in camera inspection, a similar proce-






[18 U.S.C. §3500 (1958)]
"(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement
or report in the possession of the United States which was made by a Govern-
ment witness or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) to
an agent of the Government shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or
inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of
the case.
"(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct ex-
amination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States
to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the posses-
sion of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the
witness has testified. If the entire contents of any such statement relate to the
subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order it to be
delivered directly to the defendant for his examination and use.
"(c) If the United States claims that any statement ordered to be produced
under this section contains matter which does not relate to the subject matter of
the testimony of the witness, the court shall order the United States to deliver
such statement for the inspection of the court in camera. Upon such delivery
the court shall excise the portions of such statement which do not relate to the
subject matter of the testimony of the witness. With such material excised, the
court shall then direct delivery of such statement to the defendant for his use.
If, pursuant to such procedure, any portion of such statement is withheld from
the defendant and the defendant objects to such withholding, and the trial is
continued to an adjudication of the guilt of the defendant, the entire text of
such statement shall be preserved by the United States and, in the event the
defendant appeals, shall be made available to the appellate court for the purpose
of determining the correctness of the ruling of the trial judge. Whenever any
statement is delivered to a defendant pursuant to this section, the court in its
discretion, upon application of said defendant, may recess proceedings in the
trial for such time as it may determine to be reasonably required for the examin-
ation of such statement by said defendant and his preparation for its use in the
trial.
"(d) If the United States elects not to comply with an order of the court
under paragraph (b) or (c) hereof to deliver to the defendant any such state-
ment, or such portion thereof as the court may direct, the court shall strike from
the record the testimony of the witness, and the trial shall proceed unless the
court in its discretion shall determine that the interests of justice require that a
mistrial be declared.
"(e) The term "statement", as used in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this
section in relation to any witness called by the United States, means-
(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise
adopted or approved by him; or
(2) a stenographic mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a tran-
scription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement
made by said witness to an agent of the Government and recorded contem-
poraneously with the making of such oral statement."
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